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Resilience as Emergent Behavior
Peter Hayes*
In this article, I briefly review the diversion of the climate policy world
into a single-minded fixation with mitigation. I assert that it is increasingly
clear that the main game is now adaptation which renders mitigation no less
urgent, but shifts the political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be
ignored any longer. I suggest that global state and market-based solutions
will fall far short of an adequate response. The responsibility will devolve to
cities and local communities to pick up the pieces. I review some of the
swarming and network strategies that may enable these communities to
supplement or supplant state-based adaptation frameworks over the coming
generation.

Mitigation-Adaptation
The first phase (1988-2008) of climate change policy and research work
focused on gaining traction with the political elites. The task entailed
overcoming political, cultural, and institutional resistance to recognition of
the validity and soundness of the science on the one hand, and learning
from practical grappling with the technical-economic mitigation problem in
the real world on the other. The political path of least resistance over these
two decades was to create a global scientific consensus based on modeling
and compiling data sets. These data sets were used to both inform and
convince policy makers to attend to the climate issue, while also focusing on
the tractable, affordable, and (in principle) global positive sum game of
“mitigation.” Mitigation was stressed based on the belief that an ounce of
mitigation now is worth a pound of adaptation later, especially when the
benefits of mitigation are global no matter where achieved and shared,
whereas the benefits of adaptation are mostly local and not shared.
This political task was enshrined in the 1992 Climate Change
Convention which created new institutions and related methods, particularly
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implementing agencies. Global
actors largely ignored the issue of burden sharing in the pursuit of efficient
allocation of the minimal resources that were made available to build
mitigation capacity in poor countries. Equitable and adequate international
burden sharing of mitigation cost was mostly disregarded in the effort to
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“start the ball rolling” and to keep the climate negotiations alive, with or
without the United States as a prime mover.
In this start-up phase, the international community accorded
secondary importance to adaptation and subordinated to the primary task of
achieving policy consensus that climate change exists and matters. The
intention was to avoid distraction from mitigation, and the strategy was
grounded in the belief that mitigation was and is the first order of business.
The first of these goals – achieving a global consensus that climate change
risk is real and pressing – was achieved, albeit belatedly. The result,
however, was that science of climate was diverted away from investigating
many urgent and critical adaptation issues. Instead, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) focused scientific research on climate
change to support the demands of inter-state negotiations and to defining
impacts. Consequently, a conceptual and institutional framework for global
adaptation is almost absent.

What Is at Stake?
In 1972, Jun Ui published his basic theory of kogai, which he derived
from his experience of working with the victims of mercury poisoning at
Minamata in 1958 and in their court case from 1968-71, then articulating the
“principles of pollution” in his KOGAI Newsletter from Polluted Japan,
published by his organization Jishu Koza in the nineteen seventies.1 Ui was
the first modern theorist to explain the displacement in space and time of
biological and physical costs via ecological systems from one class of
beneficiaries to other classes of victims, thereby generalizing the experience
of the Minamata episode. In many respects, this dynamic is similar to the
problem of land mines that are strewn for short-term military advantage, but
remain in situ for years, even decades, until they explode and maim or kill
civilians who had no relationship to the original conflict. One can think of
the imposition of the array of biological, physical, and social-cultural
climate costs in a similar manner to hurling hand grenades randomly into
the future without knowledge or concern as to when or where they fall to the
ground, and who would be hurt or killed when the grenade exploded. In
short, climate risk has global, spatial, and temporal dimensions. The costs
of climate change relative to conceivable worlds without massive
anthropogenic climate loading are vast, although they are still not known
with any precision. It is already well understood that these costs will fall
disproportionately on those least able to bear them.
Incremental
adaptation costs are likely to eventually exceed the marginal costs of
mitigation and justified global burden sharing (roughly $30 billion per year

1. Jun Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan 103-31 (Jun Ui ed., United Nations
University Press 1992).
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in 1994 dollars)2 by at least an order of magnitude, possibly much more.3
Displacing the costs of climate change due to the activities of this
generation’s wealthy and powerful societies onto future poor and vulnerable
populations on Earth will be by far the biggest fleecing in history; all that
remains is to see how devastating this impact will be.
Therefore, adaptation is now the main game, not mitigation.
Moreover, far from being the enemy of mitigation, it is at least conceivable
that the constituencies mobilized by climate impacts may finally muster the
political will to achieve the requisite levels of mitigation hitherto missing;
that is, adaptation will be the friend, not the enemy of mitigation.

Global Frameworks
In most treatments of climate change politics and economics, the key
protagonists are states and corporations, and the key institutions are
treaties and markets. Sometimes scientists and social movements are
recognized as playing epistemic or bridging roles in order to overcome
yawning institutional or market failures, but their roles are usually
epiphenomenal.
Without going into detail, the emerging global framework for building
adaptive capacity is, put mildly, weak and inadequate.4 If mitigation-related
incremental funding is running at about one percent of a justified level
based on capacity-to-pay and historic-responsibility-to-pay, incremental
adaptation funding will likely run at perhaps 0.1 percent (less money, far
greater incremental needs for adaptation than in mitigation) of a justified
level. While in general the emerging global framework for building adaptive
capacity is deficient, some organizations such as the GEF, United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), and multilateral and bilateral adaptation
projects in developing countries are exploring the new adaptation terrain.
This is excellent, exciting, and worth both investment and support. As they
explore this terrain, they are revisiting old lessons from decades of
misplaced, abused, and failed development assistance and discovering new
challenges and potential routes to reducing social vulnerability and to
increasing social resilience.

2. Peter Hayes, North South Transfer, in GLOBAL GREENHOUSE REGIME: WHO PAYS? 144,
153-54 (P.Hayes & K. Smith, eds. UN University Press/Earthscan Press, Tokyo & London
1993), available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80836e/80836E00.htm
3.

Id.

4.

See, PETER HAYES, MULTIPLE JEOPARDIES: EMERGING GLOBAL RULES FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION, available at http://www.nautilus.org/~rmit/forum-reports/0619ahayes.html. Videotape: China-U.S. Climate Change Forum: What’s at Risk?, available at
http://youtube.com/watch?v=u5j8 7MteMXk.
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State-based international assistance, however, is almost certainly far
too little and arriving far too late to rely on as a route to successful
adaptation in most of the world. Given the level of increasing and enduring
global poverty, the ability of markets to create adaptive capacities in most
rural areas and slums is highly constrained. Also, like states, markets are
unlikely to create or deliver the capacities needed for either mitigation or
adaptation. Without these capacities, massive and potentially catastrophic
climate change cannot be avoided.
These shortcomings require a search for radical new solutions based
on linked communities at a global level. If states and markets fail as badly
as seems likely, then legitimate leadership that responds to the global
climate adaptation challenge will emerge primarily at the sub-national state,
city, and local community levels, supplemented by global civil society
(roughly 25,000 intergovernmental and non-governmental international
organizations).
Fortunately, this set of diverse global-local players is already inclined
to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate in the search for shared
solutions via trans-governmental processes, inter-city linkages, and vibrant
diasporic and “glocal” networks between local communities. The cost of
long distance communication and coordination is falling rapidly; the
number of pro-active players at this level is increasing exponentially.
Already, approximately 200 major cities, perhaps 20,000 medium and small
cities and towns, and perhaps 200,000 local communities are wired and
participating in networks that are active in attempting to solve one or more
of the dozens of interrelated global problems and solutions linked directly
or indirectly with climate change, as well as directly tackling climate change
adaptation.5
At this local level, cooperative outcomes are sought out of necessity
and based upon the identification of joint interest and cooperative benefits
realized directly by communication and coordination. Such joint interests
or organic reasons to cooperate include: direct ecological interdependence
(downwind); trade; shared cultural heritage; historical origins (metropolecolonial cities); common climate circumstances; shared threats (terrorism);
etc. This process will be facilitated (and blocked as well) by some of the
innovative inter-state and market-based approaches discussed at this
conference, many of which provide clues about the future that are fresh and
provocative. Yet none of these solutions are likely to be as powerful as the
combination of necessity and solidarity that will drive city and community-

5. This is an estimate based on the assumption that roughly each of the 200
global cities (real number) has about 10 (less-global) major cities = 2,000, and each
of these has about 10 satellite small towns (approximated at 22,500 global cities,
cities, and towns); and each of these has at least 10 localities in them, hence the
estimated 200,000 localities.
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level cooperation and collaborative problem solving, orchestrated by
transnational networks.
Part of the challenge with collaborative problem-solving is to make the
stocks of existing knowledge and research capacity available to knowledge
users in response to rapidly emerging climate “issue clusters” that cross
bureaucratic-disciplinary-sector boundaries in unexpected and unconventional ways. Another is to explore the true complexity of the interrelated
problems that drive climate change and block mitigation and adaptation,
using new research methods such as agent-based rather than system-based
modeling.6
In this view, the most urgent task is not to focus on inter-state
negotiations, important as these may be. Rather, the task is to establish
principles and practices of direct cooperation between cities and local
communities of all kinds;7 identify practical and testable tools and practices
that can be developed in one locale and shared and replicated with dozens
or hundreds of others on a tailored-to-need basis;8 and establish
mechanisms for transmission and sharing of the tools and practices that
work.9 The right metaphor for this process is not institutional architecture,
but think-nets, small worlds-network theory, immunological “swarming”
behavior, and other learning strategies that rely on viral replication for scale
and success.

6. E.g., Peter Hayes, Agent-Based Modelling and Climate Change Adaptation, Global
Cities Institute Climate Change Adaptation Program (2008), available at http://gc.nautilus.
org/gci/agent-based-modelling/RMIT%20overview%20rev%20Jan31-08.pdf/ view; Anthony
Patt & B. Bernd Siebenhüner, Agent Based Modeling and Adaptation to Climate Change,
74(2), Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung (Quarterly Journal of Economic Research),
310, 310–20 (2005) (discussing an early application of agent based modeling and climate
change application), available at http://www.vulnerabilitynet.org/OPMS/getfile.php?bn=
seiproject_hotel&key=1140130223&att_id=953; Scott Moss, Claudia Pahl-Wostl & Thomas
Downing, Agent-based integrated assessment modeling: the example of climate change, 2,
Integrated Assessment, 17, 17-30, (2001) (discussing the benefit of employing social
simulation models, rather than economic models, in addressing complex environmental
problems); Brian J. L. Berry, L. Douglas Kiel, & Euel Elliott, Adaptive Agents, Intelligence,
and Emergent Human Organization: Capturing Complexity through Agent-Based Modeling,
99, Suppl. 3, Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences (2002) (an overview of
the agent-based modeling field), available at http://www.pnas. org/content/vol99/suppl_3/.
7. See, Five climate principles adopted by the SF Business Council on Climate
Change at: https://www.bc3sfbay.org/principles.
8. See, Power tools: for policy influence in natural resource management,
http://www.policy-powertools.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2008).
9. See, Climate Change Adaptation at the Global Collaborative, at
http://gc.nautilus.org/gci (last visited Oct. 13, 2008).
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Fortunately, there are many, many examples to choose from in this
early learning phase of bottom-up, “emergent” adaptation.
The
International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives, the Clinton
Foundation’s C40 Large Cities Climate Leadership Group and Climate
Initiative, and bilateral projects related to Ho Chi Minh City, Melbourne,
Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang are various examples. The San
Francisco Bay Area is a global dynamo in this dimension with participation
from individuals, groups, government, and business. Indeed, Google Foundation may be the single most powerful and creative force on the planet,
particularly if it can align with partners such as the Aga Kahn Foundation.

Conclusion
That these social capacities will collide with state and market-based
frameworks in critical respects is more or less inevitable. Whether they will
also be nurtured and provide critically needed support and extension of
these frameworks is less obvious. Optimism, however, remains important as
ever! Arguably, over the next, cities and corporations will merge, and
vibrant city-states will become more powerful relative to nation-states. The
membership of the United Nations may increase by tenfold or more, and as
a result, by 2050 the climate change dye will have been cast for the coming
millennia. This shift in power ratios, the rise of many sources of innovation
and interconnection, and above all, high levels of work-related migration,
will transform the global landscape.Of particular importance is not what
happens in the United States or Europe, but in China and India, because
these two societies and economies represent the most salient development
models for most communities on the planet. Further, Indonesia may play a
crucial role in climate development models because its 40 million Muslims
may generate an Islamic renaissance that represents a new source of global
leadership.
Whether cities and local communities will rise to the occasion and pick
up the pieces dropped by states and markets in the past remains unknown.
However, with virtual certainty, the main adaptive action will occur at local
levels. As John Holdren has long argued, we will adapt; the only question
remaining is the ratio between the various types of adaptation – mitigation,
pro-active and anticipatory adaptation, or just plain suffering.10

10. John P. Holdren, Science and Technology for Sustainable Well-Being, 319
Science, 424, 425-34 (2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/
319/5862/424.pdf.
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